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ABSTRACT
Current best practice in central banking views 
a high level of monetary policy predictability 
as desirable. A clear distinction, however, has 
to be made between short-term and longer-term 
predictability. While short-term predictability 
can be narrowly deﬁ  ned as the ability of the 
public to anticipate monetary policy decisions 
correctly over short horizons, the broader, 
ultimately more meaningful concept of longer-
term predictability also encompasses the ability 
of the private sector to understand the monetary 
policy framework of a central bank, i.e. its 
objectives and systematic behaviour in reacting 
to different circumstances and contingencies. 
In this broader sense, longer-term predictability 
is also closely related to the credibility of the 
central bank. This paper reviews the main 
conceptual issues relating to predictability, 
both in its short and longer-term dimensions, 
and discusses how a transparent monetary 
policy strategy can be – and indeed has been 
– instrumental in achieving this purpose. This 
latter aspect is investigated in an overview 
of the empirical literature, highlighting how 
ﬁ  nancial markets have been increasingly able to 
correctly anticipate monetary policy decisions 
for a number of large central banks, including 
the ECB. The paper also reviews several 
possible empirical proxies for the less-explored 
concept of longer-term predictability, which is 
inherently more difﬁ  cult to measure.
Key words: Predictability, central bank 
transparency, central bank communication
JEL: E52, E58, E61.5
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Over the last few decades central banks have 
progressively increased their emphasis on the 
transparency and predictability of their actions. 
Such developments have been inextricably 
linked to the parallel trend towards central bank 
independence and the corresponding need for 
greater accountability. 
Central banks nowadays carefully explain their 
monetary policy framework and are precise 
about what they want to achieve in terms of 
policy goals, often going well beyond strict 
legal requirements. Furthermore, they generally 
inform the public about the macroeconomic 
models on which their economic policy analysis 
is based. This and other information is provided 
to ﬁ  nancial markets and the public at large so as 
to make them increasingly familiar with the way 
central banks think and operate. This, in turn, is 
instrumental in making actions more predictable 
and in enhancing credibility. 
A clear distinction, however, has to be 
made between short-term and longer-term 
predictability. While short-term predictability 
can be narrowly deﬁ  ned as the ability of the 
public to anticipate monetary policy decisions 
correctly over short horizons, the broader, 
ultimately more meaningful concept of 
longer-term predictability also encompasses 
the ability of the private sector to understand 
the monetary policy framework of a central 
bank, i.e. its objectives and systematic 
behaviour in reacting to different circumstances 
and contingencies. In this broader sense, 
longer-term predictability is also closely related 
to the credibility of the central bank. 
This paper reviews the main conceptual 
issues relating to predictability and the role of 
transparency as one of its main determinants. 
Transparency is, on its own, insufﬁ  cient  to 
ensure a lasting impact on the formation of 
expectations by ﬁ   nancial market participants. 
Guiding interest rate expectations in fact requires 
not only forward-looking communication, but 
also consistency between words and deeds and 
a track record of monetary policy decisions 
that supports the central bank’s credibility. 
For transparency to have a positive impact 
on predictability, we show that it does not 
only matter what type of information central 
banks publish, but also how this information 
is communicated to the general public and 
ﬁ  nancial markets in particular. We argue that 
those central banks which communicate in a 
collegial, timely and frequent manner, which 
adapt their communication to their audience 
and which manage to communicate clearly and 
unambiguously will be amongst those central 
banks whose monetary policy decisions are the 
most predictable. 
Finally, measuring predictability is clearly 
not an easy task. While more effort needs to 
be devoted towards the empirical assessment 
of central banks’ longer-term predictability, 
which is inherently more difﬁ  cult to measure, 
the literature shows that ﬁ  nancial  market 
participants have been increasingly able to 
correctly anticipate central banks’ monetary 
policy decisions. Transparent monetary policies 
and improved communication efforts are likely 
to have played a signiﬁ   cant role in bringing 
about this improvement. 6
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“The result we seek is not difﬁ   cult to deﬁ  ne. 
What we want a monetary framework to 
produce is predictability in the value of money. 
We desire a monetary system that will allow 
the individual decision-maker, whether he be 
consumer, entrepreneur, seller of productive 
services, or speculator, to remove from his 
calculus uncertainty about the future course 
of the absolute price level.” (Buchanan 1962, 
p. 163)
“Most economic decisions depend, directly or 
indirectly, on the predictability of monetary 
policy. Monetary policy decisions can create 
surprises that affect outcomes from household 
decisions as to what jobs to take and where to 
live. Similarly, business ﬁ  rms  ﬁ   nd that their 
decisions on hiring and investment in physical 
capital may turn out well or poorly depending 
on the course of monetary policy and its effects 
on the economy.” (Poole 2005, p. 659)
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, central banks have 
undertaken a long journey from secretive 
to transparent institutions. Nowadays, they 
increasingly emphasise both the transparency 
as well as the predictability of their actions, 
rather than pursuing a monetary policy that 
has often largely surprised the public in the 
past. In the words of Blinder et al. (2001, p.1) 
“[...] Increasingly, central banks of the world 
are trying to make themselves understood, 
rather than leaving their thinking shrouded in 
mystery”. 
What has brought about this remarkable 
development, and what are its effects? An 
important contributing factor was a radical 
change in the thinking of economists in the 1970s,
with the role of expectations in economic 
behaviour gaining widespread attention. This 
“revolution” has not left economic thinking 
about monetary policy unaffected. Predictability 
matters because expectations are highly relevant 
for the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
In particular, consumption and investment 
decisions are based on inter-temporal 
considerations that are, to a large extent, 
inﬂ  uenced by longer-term interest rates. These, 
in turn, largely depend on private expectations 
regarding future central bank decisions. As a 
result, the effectiveness of a change in the policy 
rate is fundamentally dependent upon its impact 
on market expectations about the future path of 
short-term interest rates. 
Against these developments, central banks 
nowadays communicate more precisely what 
they want to achieve in terms of policy goals, 
often going well beyond strict legal requirements. 
Furthermore, they generally inform the public 
about the macroeconomic models on which 
their economic policy analysis is based. Also, 
the information they now release on their 
current internal analysis is both clearer and more 
plentiful than in previous times, and monetary 
policy decisions are publicly explained, either at 
press conferences or via timely releases of the 
minutes of the meetings of their decision-making 
bodies. A wealth of information is provided 
in order to make the public, and in particular 
ﬁ   nancial markets, increasingly familiar with 
the way central banks think and operate. This, 
in turn, is instrumental in making actions more 
predictable and in enhancing credibility. In short, 
the idea that monetary policy decisions might be 
a surprise to the public has been replaced by the 
notion that a central bank should be “boring”, 
in the sense that the monetary policy “reaction 
function” should be so well understood by 
the public that all relevant news comes out of 
economic developments, and not the actions or 
communications of the central bank. 
A higher degree of monetary policy predictability 
is particularly relevant for ﬁ  nancial  markets, 
where the inaccurate prediction of a central 
bank’s actions can lead to large ﬁ  nancial losses. 
It is therefore in the interest of ﬁ  nancial market 
participants to understand what central banks do 
and to take note of what is communicated. Recent 
research clearly shows that ﬁ  nancial markets do 
indeed listen and react to this communication; 
after all, in the presence of efﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial 
markets, ignoring publicly available information 7
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I   INTRODUCTION
will entail losses for individual market 
participants. More generally, there is clear 
evidence that by having ﬁ  nancial markets “in 
tune” with the central bank, economic outcomes 
can be substantially improved, to the beneﬁ  t of 
both parties. On the one hand, the central bank’s 
task of maintaining the stability of its currency 
is facilitated through well-aligned inﬂ  ation 
expectations; on the other hand, being aware 
of the central bank’s intentions has led to more 
efﬁ  cient pricing in ﬁ  nancial markets. Substantial 
progress has been made in conveying to the 
public how central banks think and act, which 
has facilitated the increase in credibility. 
This paper identiﬁ  es and assesses how, and on 
which subjects, central banks should 
communicate, so as to enhance the predictability 
of the monetary policy process.2 In so doing, 
this paper will draw an important distinction 
between the notions of short-term and longer-
term predictability. Short-term predictability is 
achieved when the public, notably ﬁ  nancial 
market participants, is in a position to anticipate 
correctly the central bank’s next monetary 
policy decisions. A more fundamental aspect of 
monetary policy predictability relates to its 
longer-term dimension, which requires that the 
public has a genuine understanding of the central 
bank’s monetary policy framework and its 
behaviour over time. We will argue that a high 
degree of predictability of interest rate decisions 
is the result of monetary policy being conducted 
in a credible, consistent and transparent manner 
that is well explained to the public. Longer-term 
monetary policy predictability hence enhances 
the effectiveness of monetary policy, while, at 
the same time, it contributes to the accountability 
vis-à-vis the public at large.
Measuring predictability is not an easy task, as 
this paper will show. While this is particularly 
true for the case of longer-term predictability, a 
variety of different approaches may be used to 
measure short-term predictability. For example, 
measures of predictability can be based on 
information derived from different money 
market asset prices or surveys of ﬁ  nancial 
market participants. The time span also matters: 
a shorter horizon focuses the empirical analysis 
towards the monetary policy decision on a given 
day and includes the information available 
to the central bank at the time of the decision, 
whereas a longer time horizon may incorporate 
additional information about the future path of 
monetary policy. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
sets out a general discussion of predictability 
and its role in practical monetary policy-making, 
addressing in particular the issue of whether 
central banks should institutionally aim for ever-
higher degrees of predictability. Section 3 then 
turns to the role of central bank transparency for 
monetary policy predictability, while Section 4 
reviews the empirical evidence. Finally, 
Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
See also “The predictability of the ECB’s monetary policy”  2 
published in the January 2006 issue of the ECB Monthly Bulletin 
for a related, albeit more condensed, analysis.8
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2  PREDICTABILITY AND MONETARY POLICY
The views about the merits of monetary policy 
predictability held by both monetary policy-
makers and academics have changed considerably 
over time. While central banks were, in the past, 
generally very secretive institutions and avoided 
predictability in their actions and objectives, a 
number of recognised academics eventually 
began to praise the beneﬁ   ts of an open and 
predictable monetary authority. For example, 
as long ago as 1962, James Buchanan suggested 
that the most meaningful criterion for monetary 
policy was predictability in the value of the 
monetary unit (see, for example, the quote at the 
beginning of this paper). Buchanan’s important 
contribution was to shed light on the harmful 
impact of price level uncertainty inherent in 
secretive monetary policy-making. For instance, 
people were demanding high premiums if they 
lent money over a longer period in order to 
cover the potential loss in purchasing power of 
their money in view of possible future increases 
in price levels. Today, virtually all central banks 
recognise that they must be predictable in their 
behaviour if the public is to trust the value of 
their currency.
2.1  WHAT IS MONETARY POLICY 
PREDICTABILITY?
The literature on monetary policy predictability 
evolved in tandem with the progressive increase 
in openness and transparency of central 
banking, a process that was substantially 
accelerated with the advent of inﬂ  ation 
targeting at the beginning of the 1990s. Most 
of this literature has been empirical in nature, 
focusing on estimating the “surprise element” 
of monetary policy decisions at the time 
of policy announcements. Predictability of 
monetary policy in these papers is therefore 
often understood to be the ability of ﬁ  nancial 
markets to correctly anticipate the next 
monetary policy decision of a central bank 
(Krueger and Kuttner 1996; Poole and 
Rasche 2000; Kuttner 2001). 
From a normative perspective, predictability of 
central bank decisions should, however, not be 
Chart 1 Predictability of Monetary Policy
Predictability of monetary policy 




Genuine understanding of the 
objective of the central bank and systematic 
behaviour of monetary policy 
Short-term predictability 
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AND MONETARY
POLICY
restricted to this narrow, short-term notion for 
at least two reasons. First, predictability in this 
limited sense does not adequately reﬂ  ect  the 
appropriateness of monetary policy decisions 
towards achieving the objective of price 
stability. As we will stress in this paper, surprise 
components in monetary policy decisions often 
reﬂ  ect uncertainty about the timing rather than 
the direction or need for policy rate changes. 
Against the background of the long and variable 
lags with which monetary policy actions are 
transmitted to prices, the precise timing of an 
interest rate decision is inherently difﬁ  cult 
to predict. Second, predictability measures 
as derived from ﬁ   nancial market data focus 
only on the understanding of monetary policy 
by  ﬁ   nancial market participants. Yet, for a 
central bank to successfully maintain price 
stability in the medium term, it is critical that 
the general public is also in a position to predict 
the broader future course of monetary policy 
(see also Bill Poole’s quote at the beginning of 
this paper). People must have an understanding 
of the workings of monetary policy so as to 
be able to judge the central bank’s ability and 
determination to safeguard the value of their 
currency. As a result, such broader understanding 
helps to guide price and wage-setting behaviour 
in a fashion that is consistent with the objectives 
of the central bank.
For these reasons, predictability of monetary 
policy decisions should be seen in a broader 
context and over extended periods. This does 
not imply that central banks do not aim at 
being predictable in the short term. In contrast, 
we will show that many central banks have 
made signiﬁ   cant progress in enhancing the 
short-term predictability of their monetary policy 
decisions, mainly with a view to smoothing 
central bank operations and to reducing interest 
rate volatility. However, we claim that monetary 
policy predictability is not about predicting the 
timing or the exact size of policy actions; what 
matters for long-term rates, and therefore for 
economic outcomes, is rather the public’s ability 
to generally predict the time horizon over which 
a new policy will persist (see also Thornton 
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Box 1
PERFECT PREDICTABILITY AND MONETARY POLICY RULES 
Monetary policy predictability has often been associated with a rule-like behaviour on the part of 
the monetary authority (Buchanan 1962, Poole and Rasche 2000, Poole 2005). In the academic 
literature, there have been several attempts, the most prominent by Taylor (1993), to formulate 
the monetary policy conduct of a central bank by specifying policy rules or reaction functions. 
Such rules are typically either postulated in a simple form,  1 linking the policy instrument to a 
small set of economic variables or indicators, or they are derived explicitly from an optimisation 
problem given a particular representation of policy objectives and the working of the economy. 
In practice, market participants often use a central bank’s track record to derive a simple and 
mechanical rule which they employ to predict future monetary policy decisions conditional on 
past reaction coefﬁ  cients and forecasts of the economic variables to which the central bank is 
assumed to react. Although there is a widespread consensus that monetary policy cannot be 
adequately described by any of the proposed rules in the literature, such rules may ﬁ  t the data 
reasonably well. 
The reason why simple mechanical rules do not fully describe central bank behaviour is that 
they are unable to take into account all relevant information to be considered by central banks, 
and are therefore also unable to offer appropriate guidance for stabilising the economy under all 
1  In the language of Svensson (2003), we are referring to simple instrument rules.
2003). Hence, we claim that a more fundamental 
aspect of monetary policy predictability relates 
to its longer-term dimension, which entails that 
ﬁ  nancial market participants and the public at 
large are in a position to anticipate correctly 
the broad direction of monetary policy over the 
medium term (see also ECB 2006; Chart 1). 
In this broader sense, predictability of monetary 
policy is the result of the interaction of a number 
of largely interdependent factors (see Chart 2). 
Central to the understanding and anticipation 
of any policy decision by a central bank is the 
monetary policy strategy. If the central bank is 
transparent about its strategy, this can provide 
a systematic and comprehensive framework for 
monetary policy decisions and clearly identify a 
central bank’s objectives and methods to conduct 
monetary policy (see also Section 3.2.1). This 
allows the public to assess the central bank’s 
behaviour over time and is at the essence of 
acquiring a high level of credibility, a necessary 
precondition for a central bank which aims to be 
predictable in its monetary policy deliberations. 
For example, if the central bank consistently 
adheres to its institutional objectives and 
strategy, it will gain credibility and the public 
will gain an understanding of its behaviour, 
also as a result of the behaviour of short-term 
interest rates. Learning about the central bank’s 
responses to a changing economic environment 
takes time, but it will ultimately result in 
a genuine understanding of the monetary 
authority’s systematic behaviour. However, the 
strategy does not entail a rule-like behaviour on 
the part of the monetary authority, which would 
imply quasi-perfect predictability, but rather 
serves as a systematic device to reconstruct the 
logic of each single policy decision (see Box 1). 
For instance, the longer inﬂ   ation is low and 
stable, the more likely economic agents are to 
understand the central bank’s response pattern 
to different economic shocks so as to ensure 
price stability. Put differently, “perhaps the best 
a central bank can do is to ‘teach’ the market its 
way of thinking” (Blinder 2002, p. 25).11
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A fundamental prerequisite for credibility is that 
the actual decision-making by the central bank 
must be consistent with the logic of its strategy. 
If market participants perceive a persistent 
mismatch between the broad prescriptions of 
the strategy, realised policy decisions and public 
explanations by policy-makers, markets have 
no grounds to believe that policy-makers will 
adhere to the strategy in the future. In this sense, 
the strategy should also serve as a consistent and 
systematic framework for the policy discussions 
in the decision-making bodies and as a vehicle 
for explaining the conduct of monetary policy 
to the public. This ensures consistency between 
internal analysis and external communication, 
which is the essence of transparency and is at the 
heart of a predictable monetary policy.
The perceived adequacy and credibility of the 
central bank strategy will in turn inﬂ  uence the 
expectation formation process by the private 
sector and is likely to establish the degree of 
volatility in these expectations. For example, a 
credible monetary policy strategy aimed at 
securing price stability in the medium term will 
help to stabilise inﬂ  ation expectations at levels 
consistent with those of the central bank if, and 
only if, the strategy is perceived as credible 
and adequate by the private sector. In this 
regard, a coherent track record of reliable 
policy-making is indispensable for the 
credibility of the strategy. However, a credible 
strategy alone will not necessarily result in a 
highly predictable monetary policy, as it will 
most likely be strongly affected by external 
shocks outside the control of the central bank. 
Given the myriad of these shocks, a central 
bank’s strategy can implausibly address ex ante 
all possible contingencies that may arise and 
could give guidance to market participants 
about the policy-maker’s reaction to each of 
these contingencies.3 These random shocks 
may drive a wedge between the views of the 
central bank and the private sector. However, 
In the words of Trichet (2006): “No central bank […] can  3 
reasonably spell out in advance its reaction to every conceivable 
contingency. This means that surprises in our behaviour can 
never be ruled out, notably in the face of potent shocks.”
conceivable circumstances (ECB 2001). Empirical reaction functions often also disregard the 
fact that monetary policy decisions involve, to a certain degree, policy-makers’ judgement of 
the implications of new information contained in macroeconomic data, and that this judgement 
may vary over time and is state-dependent. For example, central banks may react differently to 
a situation in which inﬂ  ation is above the announced deﬁ  nition of price stability, depending on 
whether they expect this situation to last for a longer or a short period of time.2 Hence, while a 
deeper understanding of the systematic behaviour of monetary policy should normally result in 
a high level of longer-term predictability, and to an enhanced short-term predictability, “perfect” 
predictability would not generally be attainable for a monetary policy geared towards achieving 
price stability over the medium term. 
In principle, a central bank could achieve perfect predictability by systematically pre-announcing 
future changes in interest rates and later implementing them under any contingency. However, 
an unconditional commitment by the central bank to the path of future policy rates would restrict 
the ﬂ  exibility of its monetary policy, limiting its ability to react swiftly to rapid changes in the 
economic situation. The need to react quickly may also, on occasion, limit the opportunity to fully 
prepare markets prior to a monetary policy decision. Alternatively, perfect predictability could 
be easily achieved if the central bank always mechanically executes the expectations of market 
participants. However, this would result in these expectations becoming self-fulﬁ  lling even if 
they do not necessarily reﬂ  ect an adequate monetary policy stance to maintain price stability 
(Bernanke and Woodford 1997). 
2  In this sense, longer-term predictability also encompasses a central bank’s ability to allow for temporary deviations from its objective 
without damaging its commitment to achieve the objective in the medium term. 12
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for monetary policy to be predictable, it is 
important that this divergence of views is only 
of a temporary nature and does not translate 
into a destabilisation of longer-term 
expectations that should at all times remain 
ﬁ  rmly anchored to the objectives of the central 
bank.
To sum up, a high level of monetary policy 
predictability arises if the central bank’s strategy 
is perceived as adequate and credible by the 
general public, if the decision-makers adhere 
to the strategy in their internal deliberations 
and external communication and if, as a 
result, longer-term private expectations are 
consistent with the central bank’s objectives, 
even in the presence of shocks outside the 
control of the policy-makers. A high level of 
predictability should therefore be seen as the 
natural outcome of a central bank’s consistent 
pursuit of its monetary policy strategy. As 
such, the predictability of interest rate decisions 
can be regarded as an observable reﬂ  ection of 
the public’s overall understanding of a central 
bank’s monetary policy framework as well as the 
private sector’s ability to translate the changing 
economic circumstances into anticipations of a 
central bank’s broad policy direction within a 
well-deﬁ  ned and credible strategy.
2.2  WHY DOES PREDICTABILITY MATTER FOR 
MONETARY POLICY?
Today, most central banks and academics 
emphasise the predictability of interest rate 
decisions as an important ingredient in the 
successful and effective conduct of monetary 
policy (King 2000; Woodford 2003; Bernanke 
2004b; Blinder and Wyplosz 2004; Issing 2005; 
Trichet 2005). This is not to say that monetary 
policy decisions necessarily ratify market 
expectations. Yet central banks will not attempt 
to deliberately surprise ﬁ   nancial markets. In 
other words, “a successful central bank should 
be boring” (King 2000) in the sense that news 
about monetary policy should arise in the 
macroeconomic news, and not in the actions and 
announcements of the central bank. 
This remarkable change in the importance 
attached to predictability in central banking 
practice was largely inﬂ  uenced  by  the 
widespread gain of the role of expectations in 
economic thinking. In particular, the rational 
expectations revolution that started in the 
early 1970s established the view that current 
inﬂ  ation reﬂ  ects, to a large extent, expectations 
about future price developments and, hence, 
can be reduced in a less costly manner if the 
central bank is credible in its future 
determination to do so (Sargent 1982). If 
economic agents believe in a central bank’s 
commitment to reducing inﬂ  ation in a lasting 
way, this should affect current inﬂ  ation through 
the adjustments in future price expectations. 
Hence, predictability matters because 
expectations matter for the effectiveness of 
monetary policy.4
In fact, central banks can directly inﬂ  uence 
only very short-term interest rates through 
their monetary policy actions. However, 
consumption and investment decisions and, 
ultimately, medium-term price developments, 
are based on inter-temporal considerations that 
are, to a large extent, inﬂ   uenced by longer-
term interest rates. These, in turn, largely 
depend on private expectations regarding 
future central bank decisions, and therefore 
on the public’s assessment of a central bank’s 
ability and determination to achieve its 
objective in the medium to long term. Hence, 
the effectiveness of a change in the policy rate 
is fundamentally dependent upon its impact on 
market expectations about the future path of 
short-term interest rates. Monetary policy is 
therefore increasingly recognised as the art of 
managing expectations, and a predictable and 
credible monetary policy is vital in order for 
such expectations to be managed effectively. 
Moreover, given the partially substantial 
lags in the transmission of monetary policy, 
high levels of longer-term predictability are 
desirable for central banks as this can lead to a 
To quote Woodford (2005), p.15: “Not only do expectations  4 
about policy matter, but, at least under current conditions, very 
little else matters.”13
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more immediate translation of monetary policy 
intentions into investment and consumption 
decisions, thus accelerating the necessary 
economic adjustments.
In this sense, longer-term predictability also helps 
to guide price and wage-setting behaviour in a 
fashion which is consistent with the objectives of 
the central bank. In a setting where the private 
sector has no clear understanding of the central 
bank’s reaction to economic developments, 
poor predictability may result in a perceived 
lack of commitment to its objectives on the 
side of the central bank, and thus in inﬂ  ation 
expectations not being anchored in a manner that 
is consistent with the central bank’s objectives. 
Short-term changes in inﬂ  ation and output might 
then become more protracted via wage and 
price-setting behaviour, possibly resulting in 
unwarranted economic ﬂ  uctuations and welfare 
losses (see also Section 3.2.1). Therefore, through 
a consistent and credible implementation of its 
monetary policy strategy over time, longer-term 
predictability is fostered and a central bank can 
positively inﬂ  uence the price and wage-setting 
behaviour of private agents.
Moreover, by being predictable in both the 
short and long term, central banks avoid market 
uncertainty both ex ante and ex post. Ex ante 
because the ability of market participants to 
broadly predict the future course of monetary 
policy reduces uncertainty among investors 
and thereby facilitates the pricing of assets and 
lowers risk premia, which, in turn, contributes 
to the efﬁ  ciency of market allocation; ex post 
because market participants are less likely to be 
surprised by the central bank’s monetary policy 
decisions. If the market anticipates the systematic 
behaviour of the central bank, then the market 
should only adjust to news (e.g. data releases), 
but not to the central bank’s announcements 
of monetary policy decisions. Consequently, 
private agents are in a better position to manage 
and hedge the risks stemming from market 
uncertainty and this, in turn, may contribute to 
enhancing economic welfare.
To summarise, the above reasoning suggests 
that central banks affect the economy at least 
as much through their inﬂ  uence on expectations 
as through any direct effect of monetary policy 
decisions on short-term interest rates. Hence it 
is important not only that a central bank makes 
the right decisions as often as possible, but also 
that its actions are predictable (Woodford 2003). 
This, in turn, will allow for inﬂ  ation expectations 
to be in line with the central bank’s view of 
the outlook for price developments, thereby 
enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy 
through its positive inﬂ  uence on the expectation 
formation process. 14
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3  THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANK 
TRANSPARENCY FOR MONETARY POLICY 
PREDICTABILITY
Over the past decades most central banks have 
steadily increased their level of transparency. The 
rationale behind this development is manifold 
and relates, among other things, to the recent 
increase in central bank independence and its 
corresponding need for greater accountability.5 
While some degree of transparency is required to 
safeguard the democratic legitimacy of 
independent central banks, most have already 
gone far beyond the legal requirements for 
accountability in their openness and transparency. 
This is so because central banks are aware that 
transparency and its main instrument, 
communication, have a positive effect on 
predictability and on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy.
3.1  WHY DOES TRANSPARENCY IMPROVE 
PREDICTABILITY?
As we have argued above, monetary policy-
making is an inherently complex process that 
cannot adequately be described by any precise 
rule which would govern the behaviour of a 
central bank in any contingency. In a scenario 
where both the central bank and private agents 
have complete information about the economy, 
a perfectly predictable monetary policy could be 
attained with a minimum level of transparency. 
The only requirement in this case is the 
awareness of the policy instrument (or a weak 
form of policy transparency in the terminology 
of Geraats 2002). This would allow private 
agents to infer the policy rule with a high degree 
of certainty. Monetary policy decisions could 
then be perfectly anticipated by assessing the 
impact of new incoming information in line 
with the policy rule followed by the monetary 
authority (Woodford 2005). 
In practice, the information set on which 
policy-makers make their decisions is 
imperfect, and monetary policy decisions 
are the outcome of a judgemental process in 
which policy-makers must continuously assess 
new economic, ﬁ   nancial and monetary data 
against their implications for the objectives 
of the central bank. This process implies four 
potential sources of information asymmetry, 
which can reduce the level of predictability 
and thereby increase uncertainty surrounding 
monetary policy decisions for the private 
sector. First, the private sector may not know 
the exact objectives of the central bank (part of 
what is labelled as “political transparency” in 
Geraats 2002). Monetary policy actions will be 
fairly hard to predict if the public are unclear 
about what the central bank ultimately aims to 
achieve. It would be hard for the public to know 
whether an unexpected policy move signals 
a change in the policy-makers’ objectives, 
a change in their economic outlook, or both 
(see also Bernanke 2004a). Second, ﬁ  nancial 
market participants and the public may not be 
aware of the set of economic indicators and the 
underlying formal analysis that the central bank 
uses in its assessment of the monetary policy 
stance (“economic transparency”; see also 
Haldane and Read 2000). In this case, even if 
there were some regularity in terms of policy-
makers’ reactions to certain indicators, the public 
would not be in a position to disentangle the 
central bank’s behaviour if there is uncertainty 
about which indicators policy-makers look 
at. Third, even if the public were to be aware 
of the set of economic indicators which are 
of relevance to the central bank, they may be 
unclear about the policy-makers’ interpretation 
and reading of the data, their reasoning and 
their understanding as well as their intentions 
(Issing 1999).6 Finally, there may be uncertainty 
surrounding the workings of monetary policy. 
Even if the central bank has spelt out publicly 
the indicators it looks at and the objectives it 
pursues, the private sector may ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to 
correctly anticipate monetary policy decisions if 
it is unclear about how monetary policy reacts 
to changes in the economic environment and 
See Geraats (2002) for a survey on central bank transparency. 5 
Issing (1999) also argues that if the central bank is clear and  6 
open about its objectives and strategy, the policy-makers’ 
interpretation and judgment of the data is the only possible 
source of information asymmetry.15
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how monetary policy decisions are transmitted 
to the economy. 
By being transparent, a central bank can 
reduce these sources of information asymmetry 
(and the associated uncertainty) between the 
monetary authority and the private sector and 
can thereby increase the level of monetary 
policy predictability beyond the market’s 
simple interpretation of the policy regularities 
governing its past behaviour. By explaining to 
the public in an open, clear and timely manner 
the process of monetary policy-making and the 
rationale behind policy decisions, the central 
bank enhances the understanding of its mandate, 
policy strategy and decisions, which in turn 
allows the markets and the general public to 
better anticipate the future course of monetary 
policy. In this sense, transparency complements 
monetary policy decisions by gaining inﬂ  uence 
over interest rate expectations beyond the 
immediate policy meeting. As a consequence, 
the public will be better placed to correctly 
interpret central bank behaviour and to form 
more accurate expectations about future policy 
decisions in line with the central bank’s views. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) provide an 
illustration of how central bank transparency 
may reduce the lag in the transmission of 
monetary policy and render monetary policy 
more effective. They show how market interest 
rates evolved during a six-week period prior to a 
25 basis point rise in the federal funds target rate 
once in 1997 – when the Federal Reserve did 
not provide any indications about likely future 
changes in the policy rate – and once in 2000 – 
when the Federal Reserve issued in advance a 
bias statement that was tilted towards a 
tightening of the policy rate. Although in both 
scenarios the markets had successfully 
anticipated the change in the policy rate by the 
time of the FOMC meeting, in the 2000 case, 
ﬁ  nancial market participants had priced in the 
expected change immediately following the 
release of the bias statement, whereas in 1997 
market interest rates changed signiﬁ  cantly later 
and only shortly prior to the meeting in which 
interest rates were set (see Chart 3).7 
Nevertheless, transparency itself cannot be 
understood as an independent ‘policy tool’ and 
there are limitations to its effectiveness. First, it 
is by itself insufﬁ  cient to ensure a lasting impact 
on the formation of expectations by ﬁ  nancial 
market participants. In order to guide interest 
rate expectations, not only is forward-looking 
communication necessary but also consistency 
between words and deeds and a track record 
of monetary policy decisions that supports the 
central bank’s credibility. For instance, Rosa and 
Verga (2005), in the case of the ECB, and Pakko 
(2005) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a), 
in the case of the US Federal Reserve, found 
that words are usually followed by consistent 
facts. Second, transparent communication alone 
will not reduce all uncertainties surrounding 
monetary policy-making. For example, both 
the central bank and the private sector may 
face uncertainties regarding the structure and 
the working of the economy. What needs to be 
minimised, therefore, is the uncertainty about 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) show econometrically that  7 
this enhanced anticipation effect, owing to the change in the 
disclosure practice of the Federal Reserve, holds true in general, 
and not only for the above example.
Chart 3 Adjustment of market interest rates 
under alternative disclosure regimes
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Source: Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a).
Note: Both tightening days are scaled so as to be shown on day 30 
on the horizontal axis. Day 0 refers to the corresponding previous 
FOMC meetings.16
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central banks’ responses to new information 
(Poole 2003). 
Predictability is therefore often viewed as 
an immediate consequence of central bank 
transparency. However, given the intrinsically 
uncertain functioning of the economy and 
the fact that monetary policy decisions are 
necessarily based on judgement and cannot 
be taken mechanically, a lack of predictability 
might not necessarily be related to a lack of 
transparency (Perez-Quiros and Sicilia 2002). 
Therefore, while central bank transparency 
can reduce some of the uncertainty by making 
relevant information publicly available, it 
will, under normal circumstances, not result 
in perfect predictability due to the remaining 
sources of uncertainty outside the control 
of the central bank. However, as long as the 
central bank provides all relevant information 
to ﬁ  nancial market participants and the general 
public, monetary policy will not be a source of 
uncertainty itself and will be predictable in the 
broader sense as described above. 
3.2  WHAT SHOULD CENTRAL BANKS BE 
TRANSPARENT ABOUT TO IMPROVE 
PREDICTABILITY?
As pointed out in the preceding section, there 
are four potential and relevant sources of 
information asymmetry between the monetary 
authority and the private sector: (1) the policy-
makers’ objectives; (2) the transmission of 
monetary policy; (3) the set of economic 
indicators used in a central bank’s assessment 
and the underlying formal analysis; and (4) the 
policy-maker’s judgement, assessment and 
interpretation of the state of the economy. 
While this catalogue seems already very 
suggestive to what central banks should be 
transparent about,8 it is neither exhaustive nor 
exclusive, but provides a reasonable ‘norm’ for 
a central bank striving to be transparent and 
predictable.9 Below we will refer to the ﬁ  rst 
three categories as transparency about the 
monetary policy strategy, i.e. the central bank’s 
objectives and its solid conviction as to how 
monetary policy affects the economy in broad 
terms, while we will refer to the last category 
as transparency about the monetary policy 
stance, i.e. the central bank’s assessment of the 
implications of the prevailing interest rate 
setting on the current and future state of the 
economy.
3.2.1 TRANSPARENCY REGARDING THE MONETARY 
POLICY STRATEGY 
For a central bank to achieve high levels of 
longer-term predictability, it is essential that 
it is transparent about its monetary policy 
strategy, and that it is credible in terms of its 
objective(s). Market participants’ uncertainty 
about the ultimate objective of monetary policy 
may have several undesirable macroeconomic 
consequences. If a central bank’s objective is 
to deliver price stability, uncertainty about its 
notion of price stability could increase inﬂ  ation 
persistence, as market participants may not 
be in a position to attribute ﬂ  uctuations  in 
inﬂ   ation to exogenous disturbances outside 
the control of the central bank or to changes 
in its objective. In this case, monetary policy 
actions cannot be assessed against the central 
bank’s objectives and the private sector may 
not expect monetary policy to overcome a 
positive inﬂ  ationary shock, for example. This 
adjustment in expectations would lead to an 
increase in inﬂ  ation today and thus to a slower 
reversal (Orphanides and Williams 2005). 
A central bank which aims to achieve price 
stability but which has not made the deﬁ  nition 
of its concept of price stability public, would 
need to react to such misconceptions, for 
instance by reacting particularly strongly to 
inﬂ   ationary risks in order to pre-empt the 
emergence of doubts about its determination 
Blinder et al. (2001) provide a similar listing, comprising three  8 
main categories of information: the central bank’s goals, its 
methods of analysis and its decision-making process.
For instance, an example of non-exhaustiveness would be  9 
a central bank’s public announcement of monetary policy 
decisions. Nowadays, it is common practice among central banks 
to inform the public about monetary policy decisions as soon as 
the decision has been taken; there is substantial evidence that this 
practice has improved the markets’ understanding of monetary 
policy considerably (see Lange et al. 2003; Poole, Rasche 
and Thornton 2002) for a description of this in the case of the 
US Federal Reserve Bank.17
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in delivering its objectives. Furthermore, more 
inﬂ  ation persistence implies a less favourable 
environment when the economy is hit by 
supply shocks which move inﬂ  ation and output 
in opposite directions. Since the inﬂ  ationary 
process is stronger and more persistent, 
it requires a more sizeable and protracted 
reaction on the part of the central bank, which 
might unnecessarily increase macroeconomic 
volatility. 
In practice, transparency about central banks’ 
objectives varies. On the one hand, some 
central banks have announced a quantiﬁ  ed 
objective, most notably for the case of inﬂ  ation 
targeting central banks or central banks with a 
ﬁ   xed exchange rate, while others have 
published a precise deﬁ  nition of the concept of 
price stability (e.g. the ECB’s deﬁ  nition  of 
price stability is based on inﬂ  ation  being 
“below, but close to 2 per cent”). On the other 
hand, a number of central banks remain more 
vague by publishing no more than the type of 
objective they aim to deliver (e.g. the Federal 
Reserve’s objective to pursue maximum 
employment, stable prices and moderate long-
term interest rates). In fact, there is compelling 
empirical evidence that the quantiﬁ  cation  of 
the central bank’s objective positively 
inﬂ   uences the longer-term predictability of 
monetary policy in the sense that the quantiﬁ  ed 
objective can serve as a focal point for private 
agents’ expectations (see also Section 4 
below).10 For example, empirical ﬁ  ndings 
conﬁ   rm that the precise deﬁ   nition of price 
stability, or the announcement of an inﬂ  ation 
target, both lowers inﬂ  ation expectations and 
helps to anchor them at levels consistent with 
the central bank’s deﬁ  nition of price stability 
(see Johnson 2002; Levin et al. 2004). 
Moreover, the quantiﬁ  cation of the objective 
also reduces the sensitivity of inﬂ  ation 
expectations to past inﬂ  ation and, at the same 
time, to macroeconomic news (Gürkaynak et 
al. 2006). 
Beyond the public announcement of a central 
bank’s objective, openness about the monetary 
policy strategy that a central bank pursues also 
supports the markets’ general understanding of 
the workings of monetary policy, i.e. the 
systematic response of monetary policy to 
changing economic developments. Firstly, this 
requires transparency about the set of economic 
indicators that the central bank uses in its 
regular assessment of the monetary policy 
stance. Financial markets must be clear about 
what economic, ﬁ   nancial and monetary data 
the central bank looks at if they want to 
anticipate the future course of monetary policy. 
Only with a clear understanding of what 
matters for monetary policy and, possibly even 
more importantly, what does not matter, will 
ﬁ   nancial market participants be able to 
adequately form their expectations about future 
monetary policy decisions as a response to 
economic news.11 Secondly, central banks 
should disclose how monetary policy will 
typically react to developments in these 
indicators in the face of risks to the achievement 
of the central bank’s objective. For example, 
the ECB has provided an exhaustive account of 
how it assesses risks to price stability in the 
framework of its two-pillar monetary policy 
strategy (ECB 2004). Thirdly, central banks 
must be open about how monetary policy 
affects the economy, i.e. the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and how it 
affects the systematic conduct of monetary 
policy. This includes the publication of 
In cross-country analyses, it has also been found that the  10 
existence of a quantiﬁ   ed objective has a measurable impact 
on actual inﬂ  ation outcomes. In that regard, it is primarily the 
quantiﬁ  cation of the objective that matters, more than its exact 
form. While quantiﬁ  ed monetary or exchange rate objectives 
also tend to lower actual inﬂ  ation, the largest effects were found 
for central banks that announced a precise deﬁ  nition of price 
stability (Fatas et al. 2007).
Gerlach (2004) and Rosa and Verga (2005) examined ofﬁ  cial  11 
ECB publications to identify the set of economic and monetary 
variables that the ECB seems to consider relevant for its policy 
decisions. Gerlach, for instance, concluded that output gaps are 
likely to play no decisive role in actual interest rate settings of the 
ECB, though they may be highly signiﬁ  cant in empirical reaction 
functions, because they are not mentioned in the Editorials of the 
ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. By contrast, he ﬁ  nds that measures of 
economic sentiment or conﬁ  dence appear to play an important 
role as they are both frequently referred to in the Editorials and 
found to be statistically more signiﬁ  cant than other measures of 
real economic activity.18
ECB
Occasional Paper No 83
March 2008
macroeconomic models that underlie the in-
house analysis,12 but also requires a central 
bank to explain the limits of its mandate and 
abilities to the public so as to avoid raising 
false expectations that result in a loss of 
credibility (see also Issing 2005). For example, 
given the long and variable lags of monetary 
policy, the central bank can control inﬂ  ation 
only in the medium to longer term and cannot 
offset short-term changes in the inﬂ  ation rate 
that are caused by more volatile components of 
the price index (e.g. energy and food prices). A 
precise and consistent central bank strategy 
will minimise the sensitivity of expectations to 
short-term shocks and, more generally, increase 
monetary policy predictability by avoiding 
raising false expectations from the outset.
3.2.2 TRANSPARENCY REGARDING THE MONETARY 
POLICY STANCE
In an environment of incomplete information 
about the state of the economy and how it 
functions, genuine understanding of the central 
bank’s strategy and objective is a necessary, 
albeit insufﬁ   cient, condition for market 
participants to form pertinent expectations 
regarding the future course of monetary policy. 
Discrepancies between the expectations of the 
private sector and those of the central bank 
may emerge at any point in time because of 
differences in the interpretation and assessment 
of the state of the economy and the associated 
policy reactions.
Central banks therefore make considerable 
efforts to explain the economic rationale 
underlying monetary policy decisions by 
providing detailed and comprehensive 
analyses of the current economic and monetary 
conditions and their conditional expectations of 
the most likely evolution of the economy in the 
future. In doing so, the central bank can help 
the public interpret new developments in key 
economic variables, such as aggregate demand, 
inﬂ  ation or money growth, and allow markets 
to react accurately to these developments. For 
instance, based on an analysis of the Editorials 
of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, Gerlach (2004) 
found that the Governing Council’s interest 
rate decisions can be systematically tied to its 
assessment of economic conditions. Hence, 
based on such explanations, observers can 
continuously reﬁ  ne their understanding of the 
systematic behaviour of monetary policy and 
will be in a position to infer the central bank’s 
inclination of future policy changes from 
its regular and consistent discussion on the 
economic outlook, resulting in a high level of 
short and longer-term predictability.
One aspect of such communication on the 
economic outlook, namely the central bank’s 
forecast on key economic indicators, seems 
particularly relevant with respect to the 
predictability of monetary policy. Given the 
forward-looking nature of monetary policy, 
virtually all central banks generate forecasts 
on key economic variables (such as inﬂ  ation 
and economic activity) which enter into their 
assessment of the monetary policy stance.13 
Publishing these forecasts provides the public 
with additional information on the central 
bank’s assessment of the potential future course 
of monetary policy. 
An interesting dimension of these forecasts 
relates to the inherent assumptions about the 
future path of monetary policy. Macroeconomic 
forecasts are based on a set of underlying 
technical assumptions, including the assumption 
about future monetary policy. In some central 
banks projections are produced on the 
assumption of unchanged short-term interest 
With Fagan et al. (2001), the ECB has published a detailed  12 
account of its Area-Wide Model (AWM), which is used to 
deliver input into the policy debate, in January 2001. Importantly, 
also the data underlying the model have been published. Other 
models in regular use, such as the components of the ESCB 
multi-country model, estimated DSGE models for the euro area 
and short-term forecasting tools have also been presented to the 
public (see, for example, Willman and Estrada (2002), Coenen 
and Wieland (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Benalal et 
al (2004)). Similarly, the US Federal Reserve has published a 
complete description of its main macroeconomic model (Brayton 
and Tinsley 1996) as well as a Working Paper that delivers an 
in-depth description of the evolution of macroeconomic models 
used in-house (Brayton et. al 1997).
Central banks differ as regards whom carries responsibility  13 
for the forecast. While in most inﬂ  ation targeting countries the 
Board or the Governor assumes responsibility, in others, most 
notably the E(S)CB, projections are produced by staff.19
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rates in order to best inform policy-makers about 
what could happen if policy rates remained 
unchanged. Given that this assumption is most 
likely not to reﬂ   ect optimal future monetary 
policy, it should be clear that the forecast will 
not, in general, be the best predictor of future 
outcomes, in particular over longer time 
periods.14 A number of central banks, among 
them the ECB and the Bank of England, have 
therefore decided to condition their forecasts on 
an interest rate path based on market expectations 
of future interest rates as derived, for example, 
from the yield curve. Under the assumption that 
the policy rate evolves according to market 
expectations, if the central bank’s projections 
for inﬂ   ation deviate signiﬁ   cantly from the 
monetary authority’s objective, market 
participants will be in a position to review the 
implications for their expectations accordingly.15 
Finally, a few central banks, namely the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank and more 
recently Sveriges Riksbank, base their forecasts 
on their own projections of the future path of 
short-term interest rates, and release these 
projections to the public (see Chart 4). While, at 
ﬁ  rst glance, this method may seem to provide 
the most precise guidance to market participants 
about the central bank’s views on the likely 
future course of monetary policy and, at the 
same time, reduces the complexity of explaining 
the process of monetary policy-making (see also 
Woodford 2005), it could also entail the greatest 
risks for central banks in various respects.16 
First, the publication of the future path of policy 
rates poses particular challenges in making the 
conditionality on the projected evolution of the 
state of the economy understood; otherwise, 
Blinder (2002) argues that the “no change” assumption would  14 
be the preferred solution and is likely to reveal the need for an 
adjustment of policy. However, Blinder acknowledges that this 
assumption will lead to inconsistencies in the forecast, especially 
as regards long-term interest rates. 
It is noteworthy that central bank do not commit on using the  15 
interest rate path suggested by market expectations after all. If 
this were the case, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) have shown 
that expectations will then become self-fulﬁ  lling. 
Mishkin (2004) claims that “except in exceptional deﬂ  ationary  16 
circumstances like the one Japan has experienced, announcement 
of a policy path does not have much to recommend it.”
Chart 4 Future path of short-term interest 
rates: some examples
a) Key policy rate in the baseline scenario and in the 
alternatives with higher and lower inﬂ  ation
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there is a risk that it may be misinterpreted as a 
quasi-promise or a ﬁ   xed commitment to this 
path, raising false expectations and resulting in 
disorderly adjustments of interest rate 
expectations. Second, the central bank may 
crowd out the important diversity of market 
views on the likely future course of monetary 
policy and aggravate the risks of herding. This 
may happen if ﬁ   nancial market participants 
attach unreasonably high importance to the 
central bank’s forecasts relative to private 
judgements.17 Finally, the central bank may lose 
credibility over time if its forecasts repeatedly 
turn out to be different from the subsequent 
actual path of interest rates. 
Indeed, while only very few central banks have 
embarked on announcing an explicit numerical 
path for the future policy rate, a number of other 
central banks, among them the ECB, the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of Japan, have occasionally 
conveyed qualitative information through 
ofﬁ   cial statements, regular reports or public 
speeches about the future path of the policy rate. 
Qualitative guidance has been used rather 
ﬂ  exibly in the past among central banks, both in 
terms of the frequency of the announcements 
and in the degree of precision of the policy 
inclination, as well as with regard to the relevant 
time horizon of the indications. On the one side, 
central banks aim to increase the short-term 
predictability of monetary policy by providing 
indications on policy inclinations in the run-up 
to monetary policy decisions. A central bank 
thereby reduces uncertainty among market 
participants and can help to curb interest rate 
volatility. For example, the ECB at times signals 
an impending policy decision through the 
ﬂ  exible use of implicit forward language in its 
regular economic and monetary assessment, 
while avoiding any kind of pre-commitment 
with regard to future policy decisions. The 
Federal Reserve has issued explicit ‘bias’ or 
‘balance of risks’ statements in post-meeting 
statements to indicate the conditional likely 
future direction of monetary policy given the 
balance of risks to non-inﬂ  ationary  growth. 
Similarly, after an extended period of unchanged 
interest rates, in 2006 the Bank of Japan 
announced that it will provide markets with 
forward guidance on its “thinking on the conduct 
of monetary policy for the immediate future” 
(Fukui 2006). On the other hand, some central 
banks have enhanced the predictability of the 
medium-term path of future policy rates through 
the implicit use of forward-looking language 
when economic circumstances are unusual. For 
instance, at the end of 2003, the Bank of England 
signalled that, all things being equal, interest 
rates could be expected to rise gradually over 
the following months as this followed a 
prolonged period in which interest rates had 
been in decline and the MPC wanted consumers 
to be aware that economic conditions were 
changing (see Bank of England 2003). In the 
same way, the Federal Reserve announced in its 
August 2003 statement that it “believes that 
policy accommodation can be maintained for a 
considerable period” at a time when risks to 
inﬂ  ation in the United States became undesirably 
low. Likewise, in order to address the unusual 
circumstances of deﬂ  ation, the Bank of Japan 
announced in April 1999 its intention to keep 
the call rate at zero “until deﬂ  ationary concerns 
are dispelled”. It is important to stress that 
regardless of the approach taken to forward 
guidance, all central banks continuously stress 
the conditionality of such statements to ensure 
that they maintain the ﬂ   exibility to react to 
changing circumstances without loss of 
credibility, and to avoid that economic agents 
take decisions under a misguided impression of 
certainty about the future path of interest rates.18
3.3  HOW CAN TRANSPARENCY IMPROVE 
PREDICTABILITY?
Transparency means more than simply releasing 
information, as this does not by itself translate 
into a better understanding of monetary policy. 
For transparency to have a positive impact on 
This could happen if, for instance, the central bank projections  17 
outperform private forecasts (e.g. Romer and Romer 2000), or 
if market participants take the central bank projections as a focal 
point for their own expectations (Morris and Shin 2002). 
In Kohn’s (2005) words: “We need to be particularly careful that  18 
people understand how limited our knowledge actually is – the 
uncertainty and conditionality around any statement we make 
about future developments.”21
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predictability, empirical studies have shown 
that not only does it matter what type of 
information central banks publish, but also how 
this information is communicated to the general 
public and to ﬁ  nancial markets in particular. 
If monetary policy decisions are taken by a 
committee, an issue arises as to whether the 
committee members should represent their 
personal or the consensus view about the monetary 
policy stance in the public. This is likely to have 
repercussions on the predictability of monetary 
policy. For instance, a committee that informs the 
public about its different views might enhance 
predictability if this allows the public to better 
understand the ﬂ   ow of the discussion and the 
effect this has on decision-making.19 On the other 
hand, releasing dispersed views raises the 
“cacophony issue” (Blinder 2007), in the sense 
that the clarity of the message conveyed might 
suffer, leading to a loss of predictability. In that 
regard, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005 and 2007b) 
show that, on the one hand, a higher degree of 
communication dispersion among committee 
members about the conduct of monetary policy 
lessens the ability of ﬁ  nancial markets to anticipate 
future monetary policy decisions and raises the 
degree of uncertainty. They found this to hold true 
for the Bank of England, the ECB and the Federal 
Reserve. On the other hand, they ﬁ  nd  that 
communicating the risks and diversity of views 
on the committee surrounding the economic 
outlook enhances the ﬁ  nancial markets’ ability to 
anticipate the future path of interest rates, albeit 
only for the Federal Reserve. 
In a similar vein, there is evidence that ﬁ  nancial 
markets react more to communication by 
the entire committee than to statements by 
individual committee members. In the latter 
category, communication by the chairman is 
often found to be the most inﬂ  uential. Reeves 
and Sawicki (2007) ﬁ   nd that markets react 
more to collective forms of communication by 
the Bank of England’s MPC, such as the MPC 
minutes and the Inﬂ  ation Report. Reinhart and 
Sack (2006) also show that FOMC statements 
are more inﬂ  uential than speeches by FOMC 
members individually. Furthermore, statements 
by the FOMC Chairman are moving ﬁ  nancial 
markets more than those of all other FOMC 
members (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007b). 
Indisputably, whether a committee chooses to 
speak with one voice or individually is largely 
dependent on the underlying decision-making 
process in the respective committees. Decisions 
that are taken in a highly collegial manner are 
likely to be presented uniformly and vice versa. 
This discussion stresses that central banks can, 
at times, face a trade-off between the amount 
and the clarity of communication, suggesting 
that more communication does not necessarily 
enhance transparency (ECB 2002). It is important 
that a central bank organises and presents the 
information available to it in a structured manner 
and maximises its efforts to convey messages 
with the highest degree of clarity (Winkler 2000; 
Blinder 2002). The need for clarity largely stems 
from the sources of information asymmetry 
discussed above that may drive a wedge between 
the understanding of the public and the central 
bank. For example, the same piece of information 
can be interpreted differently by, say, market 
participants than by policy-makers. Given that 
ﬁ  nancial market participants react almost in real 
time to central bank communication, they may 
act before ambiguities or miscommunication 
can be corrected by the monetary authority, 
resulting in unnecessary market reactions and 
ﬁ   nancial assets being temporarily mispriced. 
Moreover, the information disseminated by the 
central bank can also be interpreted differently 
among market participants if the communication 
is ambiguous. In this case, the risk exists that 
the “common knowledge” that emerges is 
affected by inconsistencies in the policy message 
as perceived by different market participants 
and reﬂ   ects rather the “lowest common 
denominator” found among market participants 
than the central bank’s view (Morris and 
Shin 2007).20 A central bank will therefore only 
Blinder (2002) argues for instance that “multiple voices are  19 
welcome because they help to reveal the underlying reality”. 
As we will argue below, when a central bank relies on a myriad  20 
of speeches and other vehicles of public communication without 
aiming at a consistent message, common knowledge may also 
decrease.22
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succeed in achieving high levels of monetary 
policy predictability – in both the shorter and 
longer-term sense – if its communication is 
coherent and unambiguous. 
In a similar vein, central banks need to strike a 
balance between the beneﬁ  ts of communicating 
in a timely manner and the potential cost of 
providing noisy or premature information 
such as data that are still prone to revisions. 
In that context, it has also to be borne in mind 
that at some point, excessive frequency of 
announcements risks generating more noise 
than signal (Malcolm and Stone 2004). When 
central banks communicate about issues on 
which they receive noisy signals themselves, 
such communication may coordinate the actions 
of  ﬁ   nancial market participants away from 
fundamentals, in the sense that they attach too 
much importance to the central bank’s views, 
not taking into account that they reﬂ  ect a noisy 
signal (Amato et al. 2002). Hence, central 
banks have to be careful in commenting upon 
early or provisional data releases. By contrast, 
timely information about issues on which the 
central bank has more precise signals (such 
as its own deliberations in the meetings of the 
decision-making committee) seems beneﬁ  cial. 
For example, Reinhart and Sack (2006) show 
that the expedited release of the minutes of 
FOMC meetings has increased the magnitude of 
the average reaction of short and medium-term 
interest rates by 50% and 100% respectively. 
Reeves and Sawicki (2007) report similar 
results for the release of minutes by the Bank 
of England. The ECB’s press conference, which 
provides a particularly timely explanation of 
its policy decisions (i.e. on the same day), is 
also a strong market mover (Brand et al. 2006, 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007c). This suggests 
that delays in the release of information reduce 
its relevance. 
Finally, policy-makers do not only need to 
consider how they talk, but also to whom they 
are speaking. The monetary authority needs to 
adapt its communication in terms of contents 
and complexity to its various audiences, for no 
single method will achieve predictability in all 
domains. For example, ﬁ  nancial  market 
participants care ﬁ   rst and foremost about 
precisely anticipating the exact timing and 
magnitude of the next monetary policy decisions. 
For the general public, however, this is of no or 
little importance. For them, monetary policy 
predictability is closely related to a central bank 
being credible in the longer term, e.g. in being 
successful in delivering price stability over an 
extended period and for monetary policy to 
serve as a reliable anchor for price and wage-
setting. While central banks should therefore 
strive to be transparent among different 
audiences, and adapt their communication, it is 
at the same time important that their messages 
remain consistent.21
So far there is a lacuna in the empirical literature on the issue of  21 
how central banks communicate with the general public and the 
success of such communication.23
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In this section, we will discuss how measures 
of predictability can be obtained empirically 
and review the evidence on the degree to 
which central banks have been predictable in 
recent times. In doing so we shall continue to 
distinguish between measures of short-term and 
longer-term predictability.
4.1  THE DEGREE OF SHORT-TERM 
PREDICTABILITY
Most empirical studies available to date 
have focused on the notion of short-term 
predictability, given the ease with which it can 
be measured. This is most commonly done using 
changes in the prices of money market contracts 
around the time of monetary policy decisions, 
which can be interpreted as a measure of the 
“surprise” element contained in the announced 
policy decision (e.g. Krueger and Kuttner 1996; 
Poole and Rasche 2000; Kuttner 2001). In this 
context, unexpected changes in the policy rate 
or changes of a different magnitude to those 
anticipated – as well as unchanged policy rates 
when a change in the policy rate was expected – 
constitute a surprise. An alternative approach 
consists of the use of survey data. A number 
of institutions (e.g. Bloomberg, Reuters) poll 
ﬁ  nancial market analysts in a short time window 
preceding monetary policy decisions about their 
expectations as regards the upcoming decision. 
The difference between the announced decision 
and the expectation can then be taken as a 
measure of monetary policy surprise. 
Despite using somewhat different approaches 
and data, studies on the short-term predictability 
of monetary policy decisions generally 
conclude that ﬁ  nancial markets have recently 
been able to predict the monetary policy 
decisions of central banks rather well, and that 
predictability has increased over time. In a 
cross-country study, the Bank for International 
Settlements (2004, p. 77) provides compelling 
evidence that market forecast errors of 
monetary policy decisions have declined 
substantially in the last decade, compared with 
the period between the late 1980s until the 
mid-1990s, and that this development has 
occurred simultaneously for a large number of 
central banks.22 Focusing on the case of the 
United States, Lange et al. (2003) show a 
similar increase in predictability for FOMC 
decisions, and they relate this to changes in 
transparency. This is also in line with the more 
recent ﬁ  ndings of Swanson (2006), according 
to whom, since the late 1980s, increases in 
Federal Reserve transparency have been 
instrumental to the ability of both US ﬁ  nancial 
markets and the private sector to forecast the 
federal funds rate at horizons of several 
months. In a similar vein, Bell and Windle 
(2005) and Bernoth and von Hagen (2004) 
show that the predictability of monetary policy 
decisions of both the Bank of England and the 
ECB has improved since the late 1990s. 
As an illustration of this ﬁ  nding, Chart 5 shows 
developments in the minimum bid rate for the 
main reﬁ  nancing operations of the Eurosystem 
together with daily changes in the one-month 
EURIBOR. The dots close to zero (on the right-
hand scale) correspond to days on which the 
absolute daily change in market rates was smaller 
Haldane and Read (2000) ﬁ  nd particularly large surprises for  22 
Italy and the United Kingdom in the early 1990s in comparison 
with those observed in Germany and the United States over the 
same time period.
Chart 5 The minimum bid rate and daily 










main refinancing/minimum bid rate
daily change in one-month EURIBOR
Sources: Reuters and ECB calculations.
Notes: The green thin lines represent +/-12.5 basis points 
threshold values.24
ECB
Occasional Paper No 83
March 2008
than 12.5 basis points, i.e. days on which the 
ﬁ  nancial markets forecast the ECB’s monetary 
policy decisions well.23 The dots outside the 
threshold band reﬂ  ect days on which ﬁ  nancial 
markets were surprised by the decision. These 
results show that, out of a total of 144 days on 
which Governing Council meetings were held 
from 1999 to December 2007, ﬁ  nancial markets 
were surprised – according to this deﬁ  nition – on 
only eight occasions. The greatest surprise 
occurred on 17 September 2001 when the ECB 
lowered interest rates at an unscheduled meeting 
in response to the exceptional events of 
11 September 2001. The surprises are roughly 
evenly split between days on which the policy 
rate was changed and days on which it was not. 
All surprises that occurred on days on which 
there were no changes to policy rates were 
followed by a change in policy rates a month 
later, suggesting that these surprises were related 
to the precise timing of the decisions. It is also 
likely that some of the surprises were related to 
the size of the change in policy rates. This is 
particularly true for surprises that occurred 
within longer periods of a gradual tightening or 
loosening of policy rates (such as in early 2000 
or early 2003 respectively). Finally, the greatest 
surprises occurred within the ﬁ  rst three years of 
Monetary Union, indicating that the short-term 
predictability of the ECB may have increased 
over time.24  This evidence may reﬂ  ect the fact 
that  ﬁ   nancial markets have gradually learned 
about the ECB’s monetary policy framework 
and communication strategy.
How does this compare with other central banks? 
As a summary measure of short-term 
predictability, “hit rates” can be calculated, 
deﬁ  ned as the number of days when the surprise 
element in a monetary policy decision was 
smaller than a given threshold value, divided by 
the number of all monetary policy decision days. 
Higher hit rates indicate a higher degree of 
predictability. Monetary policy decision days 
include all days with scheduled meetings of the 
decision-making bodies, as well as those with 
unscheduled meetings at which interest rate 
decisions were taken. In the case of the ECB, 
this includes the monthly meeting of the 
Governing Council at which monetary policy 
decisions are normally discussed. In the exercise 
considered in Chart 6 taken from the ECB 
(2006), two threshold values were used to 
calculate hit rates. They are deﬁ   ned as a 
12.5 basis point daily change, corresponding to a 
50% probability of a 25 basis point change in the 
policy interest rate (hit rate 1), and twice the 
normal volatility of daily changes (hit rate 2). 
While the threshold values and the corresponding 
hit rates are to some extent arbitrary, they are a 
useful tool for comparing short-term 
predictability across major central banks. The hit 
rates are calculated using money market interest 
rates for assets with three different maturities 
(one month, three months and twelve months). 
As shown in Chart 6, the hit rates for different 
maturities and threshold values indicate a high 
The choice of 12.5 basis points as a threshold value is rather  23 
arbitrary, but should give a good indication of the surprise 
element contained in each policy decision. Using a stricter 
deﬁ  nition would even strengthen the point made in Chart 5. 
Accordingly, relatively early papers on the predictability of the  24 
ECB’s monetary policy occasionally ﬁ  nd the ECB to be less 
predictable than other central banks (see, for example, Ross 
2002), whereas more recent contributions tend to attribute 
a degree of predictability to the ECB that is internationally 
comparable, or even slightly better than that of other major 
central banks (see, for example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007b 
or Barclays Capital 2007).
Chart 6 Hit rates of the ECB compared with 
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lowest hit rate
highest hit rate
Hit rate 1 Hit rate 2
Sources: ECB calculations based on data from Reuters, the BIS 
and Global Financial Data.
Notes: Bars indicate hit rates for the ECB and lines represent 
the range of hit rates for a group of major central banks, i.e. 
the Federal Reserve System of the United States, the Bank of 
England, the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
the Swiss National Bank and the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand. For details on the methodology, see Wilhelmsen 
and Zaghini (2005). The sample period is 1 January 1999 to 
12 December 2005 (owing to the unavailability of data, the 
sample length for some assets in the international benchmark 
is slightly shorter). The underlying data are based on interbank 
rates of different maturities (EURIBOR for the euro area).25
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level of predictability for ECB decisions. The 
ECB hit rates are high in absolute terms, ranging 
from a low of 84% to a high of 96%, and in all 
cases are close to the upper bound of the range 
of hit rates for a group of major central banks. 
The two hit rates provide similar information, 
with hit rate 2 providing a somewhat more 
stringent test of short-term predictability. 
Wilhelmsen and Zaghini (2005) discuss 
differences across central banks according to 
these hit rates in more detail. They ﬁ  nd that when 
considering the two hit rates and a number of 
different interest rate maturities, it is not possible 
to distinguish a single best-performing central 
bank in terms of predictability. Focusing on hit 
rate 1 and the one-month maturity, Wilhelmsen 
and Zaghini ﬁ  nd that the euro area leads other 
major central banks in terms of predictability.25 
The euro area is closely followed by the United 
States and Australia, with Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and New Zealand trailing 
somewhat. The ranking of the industrialised 
countries in the Wilhelmsen and Zaghini sample 
is largely unchanged when using hit rate 2. 
However, predictability improves substantially 
when hit rate 2 is used in countries where usual 
market volatility is high (e.g. Hungary, Poland, 
South Africa and Thailand). Other comparative 
studies (e.g. Perez-Quiros and Sicilia 2002 and 
Coppel and Connolly 2003) also show that 
short-term predictability is similar across major 
central banks and at relatively high levels, in the 
sense that there are only minor market reactions 
on the day of policy announcements. 
While this evidence might not come as a 
surprise, an important point is whether these 
surprises are fundamental, i.e. whether a change 
or not in the policy rate was completely 
unexpected, or whether the surprises merely 
reﬂ   ect market participants’ erroneous 
The results refer to the time period from January 1999 to 25 
April 2004. 
Chart 7 Average number of trades per minute, on press conference days and on Thursdays 
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Sources: ECB calculations (see ECB (2007)).
Notes: Press conference days (thick line) versus Thursdays without Governing Council meetings (thin line). Vertical bars indicate 13:45, 
the time of the announcement of the monetary policy decision, and 14:30, the beginning of the ECB press conference. 3-month maturity: 
3-month EURIBOR futures traded on LIFFE; 2-year maturity: German two-year Schatz futures traded on EUREX; 5-year maturity: 
German ﬁ  ve-year Bobl futures traded on EUREX; 10-year maturity: German ten-year Bund futures traded on EUREX. The marked 
increase in trading activity at 14:30 on press conference Thursdays and other Thursdays is related to the opening of the US markets and 
the weekly release of data on US jobless claims.26
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expectations about the timing of a policy 
decision. Furthermore, because most central 
banks not only release a monetary policy 
decision on a given day but also provide 
explanations on the assessment or explicit 
forward guidance on the future course of 
monetary policy, an interest rate response on the 
day of a policy announcement could just as well 
be due to the news contained in the surrounding 
communication rather than the decision itself. 
The ECB’s case provides an interesting 
opportunity to extract these differing 
components, as unlike with other central banks 
that release their decisions and explanatory 
statements simultaneously, there is a short time 
difference between the release of the decision 
(at 13:45 CET) and its explanation (starting at 
14:30 CET). Chart 7 shows trading activity on a 
number of future markets in a time window 
ranging from 13:00 to 16:00 on the days of the 
monthly press conference (thick line) and on 
Thursdays (i.e. the same day of the week) 
without Governing Council meetings (thin line), 
expressed as averages over the time period 
1999- 2006.26 It is apparent that trading rises 
markedly in response to the announcement of 
the monetary policy decision at 13:45, but also 
during the time window of the press conference, 
i.e. in the time after 14:30. This chart gives a 
ﬁ  rst indication that both the announcement of 
the decision and the surrounding communication 
provide news to ﬁ  nancial markets.
Chart 8, taken from Brand et al. (2006), provides 
a decomposition of the impact of policy 
announcements and communication by the ECB. 
The ﬁ  rst component of the decomposition relates 
to unexpected changes in policy interest rates 
(which can be further decomposed to news 
about the size (here labelled jump) and timing 
of changes in policy interest rates) measured 
during a small time window around the 
announcement of the policy decision. The 
second component relates to changes in 
expectations about the path of monetary policy, 
measured during a time window around the 
For related evidence, see Andersson (2007). 26 
Chart 8 Decomposition of changes in the 
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Source: Brand et al. (2006). 
Note: The chart shows extracted jump, timing and path news 
relating to different, non-overlapping time windows. Jump and 
timing news are measured during a decision window spanning 
from 13:35 to 14:05, whereas path news is measured during a 
communication window spanning 14:20-15:50. Shaded areas 
indicate fortnightly meeting frequency, except for the 30 August 
2001 meeting where four weeks elapsed between meetings.27
ECB
Occasional Paper No 83
March 2008
4   HAVE  CENTRAL
BANKS BEEN 
PREDICTABLE?
detailed communication of the policy decision 
at the ensuing press conference. The two time 
periods do not overlap. Therefore, changes in 
forward rates that are used to measure news 
during the press conference can only be due to 
communication news and cannot be 
contaminated by news relating to the 
announcement of the policy decision. The chart 
reconﬁ   rms that there has been not only a 
reduction in market reactions on Governing 
Council days, but that the small remaining 
reactions relate much less to the surprise 
component for any given decision, particularly 
most recently, and much more to the surrounding 
communication and its implications for the 
future path of interest rates.27
Beyond the surprise component contained in a 
given monetary policy decision, predictability 
of monetary policy has another dimension that 
we have not yet discussed. The response of 
interest rates provides interesting insights about 
the degree to which a “representative” ﬁ  nancial 
market participant has been surprised by a given 
decision, yet does not tell us anything about the 
disagreement among participants. There are two 
ways to measure such uncertainty: by means 
of implied volatility derived from options on 
futures contracts on money market interest rates 
or by means of the disagreement observed in the 
above-mentioned surveys. 
Chart 9 depicts the evolution of implied 
volatility for the euro area.28 Given appropriate 
assumptions, implied volatility is normally 
calculated using option pricing models to 
obtain an estimate of the expected dispersion 
of future changes in short-term interest rates 
measured in percentages per annum. However, 
this direct estimate can hide very different 
levels of volatility in the futures interest rates, 
as it depends on the level of the implied interest 
rate itself. This is addressed by weighting the 
implied volatility, measured in percentages per 
annum, against the level of the implied interest 
rate. For instance, a value of implied volatility 
equal to 20% is equivalent to an annualised 
expected deviation of 40 basis points in interest 
rate changes, if the interest rate implied by the 
futures rate is 2%. Chart 9 uses a derivation of 
a constant maturity measure, obtained on the 
basis of an interpolation of an implied volatility 
term curve weighted with a corresponding 
measure of the implied interest rate. The 
implied volatility with six months to maturity 
as derived from EURIBOR futures was, on 
average, 52 basis points in the period from 
March 1999 to August 2007. However, it is 
easily recognisable from the chart that implied 
volatility has fallen drastically from relatively 
high levels at the end of 2002 to comparably 
lower values, until the most recent increase in 
August 2007 which was due to turbulences on 
international  ﬁ   nancial markets. This shift in 
the level of implied volatility might support 
the view that the ECB may have become more 
predictable over time, while, at the same time, 
this decline may have also been affected by the 
underlying macroeconomic environment.
Looking at the evidence from survey results to 
gauge uncertainty and differences of opinion 
amongst  ﬁ   nancial market participants, Berger 
et al. (2006a, 2006b) show that the assumption 
of a representative ﬁ  nancial market participant 
The same applies to the case of the Federal Reserve, see  27 
Gürkaynak et al. (2005a).
We are grateful to R. Pilegaard in the ECB for providing us with  28 
the chart.
Chart 9 Euro area volatility with six months 
to maturity
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is unrealistic. The differences in forecasting 
performance are sizable, with the best 10% 
outperforming the worst 10% of forecasters by 
an average of 5 to 10 basis points in the United 
States, and by 8 basis points in the euro area. 
There are a number of patterns that affect the 
forecasting performance of agents. In addition 
to skill, geography appears to be an important 
factor. For instance, forecasters of ECB and 
Federal Reserve decisions are affected by 
their local macroeconomic environment. In 
particular, there is evidence that forecasters 
located in regions which experience more 
idiosyncratic economic conditions perform 
worse in anticipating monetary policy.
4.2  THE DEGREE OF LONGER-TERM 
PREDICTABILITY
While a number of measures of short-term 
predictability are currently available, measuring 
a central bank’s longer-term predictability 
is inherently more complex. As deﬁ  ned  in 
Section 2, longer-term predictability can be 
regarded as the public’s general understanding 
of the overall process of monetary policy 
making, resulting in the ability to anticipate the 
broader future direction of monetary policy. 
This would suggest that measuring a central 
bank’s longer-term predictability ultimately 
translates into the measurement of how well 
the public has understood the central bank’s 
objectives, its systematic reaction to changing 
economic circumstances and – more generally – 
its economic thinking. 
While longer-term predictability is inherently 
difﬁ   cult to measure and observe, possible 
proxies may nevertheless be deﬁ  ned along the 
following dimensions.29 First, the public should 
be in a position to infer the central bank’s 
objective, and this objective should be credible. 
The extent to which this is the case can be 
measured, for example, by means of long-term 
inﬂ   ation expectations as extracted from 
surveys. These should be stable and anchored 
at levels consistent with the central bank’s 
announced objective. A second proxy is the 
extent to which ﬁ  nancial markets price long-
term inﬂ  ation expectations (see Box 2). Again, 
these should reﬂ  ect the central bank’s objective 
and be stable (implying, for instance, that they 
should be unresponsive to central bank 
communication or other news – as opposed to 
short-term inﬂ  ation expectations, which should 
adjust in response to relevant news). Finally, a 
full understanding of the monetary policy 
strategy would also ensure that market 
participants are in a position to interpret new 
economic data releases in line with the view of 
the central bank, thus increasing the 
responsiveness of affected ﬁ  nancial asset prices 
as a result of higher longer-term predictability 
(see also King 2000). However, this aspect is 
inherently difﬁ  cult to measure. 
Turning to the ﬁ   rst point, there is strong 
empirical evidence from survey data that 
inﬂ  ation expectations for all major central banks 
are indeed well-anchored at levels consistent 
with their objectives.30  For instance, long-term 
inﬂ  ation expectations (six to ten years’ ahead) 
for the euro area, as compiled by Consensus 
Economics Forecast, have remained in a range 
between 1.7% and 2% since the introduction of 
the euro in 1999.31 These expectations are very 
close to the ECB’s deﬁ  nition of price stability 
of inﬂ  ation being “below, but close to 2%” and 
conﬁ   rm its credibility and determination to 
achieve its objective in the medium to long run. 
An important factor in achieving this credibility 
clearly has been the fact that actual inﬂ  ation 
outcomes have been consistent with the ECB’s 
deﬁ   nition of price stability. Likewise, long-
term inﬂ   ation expectations for the United 
Kingdom have been between 1.8% and 2.1% 
since October 2004, the ﬁ  rst survey Consensus 
Economics Forecast conducted after the Bank 
of England had changed its inﬂ  ation target to 
2% in January 2004.32 Similarly, in Sweden and 
For a more ECB-speciﬁ  c reference, please refer to “The monetary  29 
policy of the ECB” (second edition, 2004). 
Evidently, this assessment can only be made for central banks  30 
that have quantiﬁ  ed their objective in one way or another. See 
also Castelnuevo et al. (2003) for a similar exercise. 
The last observation refers to October 2007.  31 
The April 2004 forecast round included expectations for the  32 
Retail price index, although this was no longer the reference 
index following the change in the Bank of England’s mandate.29
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Canada, both countries in which the national 
monetary authorities have followed an explicit 
inﬂ  ation target of 2% for a considerable period 
of time, inﬂ   ation expectations have been 
solidly anchored at 2% for around ten years. 
For the United States, which has not deﬁ  ned its 
inﬂ  ation objective in precise quantitative terms, 
long-term inﬂ  ation expectations have gradually 
gone down from 2.7% in early 2000 to 2.1% 
now. Overall, this solid, broad-based anchoring 
of long-term inﬂ   ation expectations seems 
even more impressive when seen against the 
background of the recent surge in oil prices that 
has been in evidence since about 2002. Trehan 
and Tjosvold (2006) found that this increase 
in oil prices does not appear to have led to a 
noticeable jump in inﬂ  ation expectations in the 
United States, United Kingdom and Canada, 
contrary to their reaction in the 1970s. It seems 
likely that this development can, at least in 
part, be attributed to an increase in the level of 
longer-term predictability of monetary policy.
Similarly, the extent to which long-term 
inﬂ   ation expectations react to ﬂ  uctuations 
in current inﬂ   ation provides another insight 
into how well the central bank’s objective is 
taken on board by market participants and 
the public at large. In theory, if the objective 
is credible and well-understood, long-term 
inﬂ   ation expectations should be decoupled 
from the developments in current inﬂ  ation. 
The Deutsche Bundesbank (2006) shows 
that long-term inﬂ   ation expectations have 
stabilised at very low levels for a large number 
of countries, in most cases even more so than 
actual inﬂ  ation, suggesting that even if inﬂ  ation 
ﬂ  uctuates at current periods, private agents tend 
to adjust their long-term inﬂ  ation expectations 
by very little. Moreover, they show that over 
the last years the link between long-term and 
short-term inﬂ   ation expectations has broken 
down, and, contrary to what was observed 
in earlier periods, there is no statistically 
signiﬁ   cant relationship between the two any 
longer. This suggests that long-term inﬂ  ation 
expectations have stabilised across countries to 
an impressive and unprecedented degree. 
This pattern is related to the transparency and 
institutional independence of central banks. 
Compared with the Bundesbank’s study, 
which analyses the time period from 1999-
2006, Levin et al. (2004) show that there is a 
signiﬁ   cant correlation between private-sector 
long-run inﬂ  ation forecasts and lagged inﬂ  ation 
for a number of industrial economies over 
the period 1994-2003. Interestingly, for that 
sample, this correlation is largely absent for 
countries that introduced explicitly quantiﬁ  ed 
inﬂ  ation objectives, but not for the others. This 
ﬁ  nding suggests that inﬂ  ation expectations had 
not been entirely anchored in some countries, 
but were instead subject to adaptive learning. 
Further supporting evidence in this direction is 
provided by studies analysing the anchoredness 
of long-term inﬂ  ation expectations as derived 
from ﬁ  nancial data. Kliesen and Schmid (2004) 
and Gürkaynak et al. (2005b) show that the 
long-term inﬂ  ation compensation demanded by 
US ﬁ  nancial market participants is responsive 
to macroeconomic news. This is in stark 
contrast to ﬁ  ndings for the United Kingdom 
with an independent Bank of England, and for 
Sweden (Gürkaynak et al. 2006), as well as for 
the euro area (Beechey et al. 2007; Ehrmann 
et al. 2007), where inﬂ  ation  expectations 
as derived from ﬁ   nancial markets are well-
anchored and are generally unresponsive to 
macroeconomic news.30
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 Box 2
INDICATORS OF LONGER-TERM INFLATION EXPECTATIONS IN THE EURO AREA
Alongside more traditional survey-based methods of longer-term inﬂ  ation expectations, recent 
years have witnessed increasingly important evidence of break-even inﬂ  ation rates (BEIR) among 
sources of information on inﬂ  ation expectations for a central bank. This box brieﬂ  y reviews such 
main sources for the euro area, ﬂ  agging elements of caution when interpreting these data for 
monetary policy purposes. 
BEIR  1
Market participants’ long-term inﬂ   ation expectations can be extracted from long-term bonds 
indexed to an inﬂ  ation rate by taking the difference between the nominal yield on a standard bond 
and the real yield on the inﬂ  ation-indexed bond (by the same issuer and, as far as possible, with 
the same maturity). Such a measure is commonly referred to as the BEIR because it provides an 
estimate of the level of expected inﬂ  ation at which, under certain assumptions, an investor would 
be indifferent as to which of the two types of bond to hold. 
While references to BEIR measures are likely to become more frequent over time in line with the 
increase in available maturities and liquidity in the inﬂ  ation-linked bond markets, it is important to 
stress that such measures remain an imperfect means of measuring inﬂ  ation expectations. 
The difference between nominal and index-linked bond yields may exist for several reasons. Firstly, 
part of the difference may be due to the existence of an inﬂ  ation uncertainty risk premium, required 
by investors to hold long-maturity nominal bonds. It is natural to expect this inﬂ  ation risk premium 
to rise with the maturity of the bond. Hence, the presence of an inﬂ  ation uncertainty premium 
would imply that the BEIR is biased upwards. Secondly, as the liquidity of the index-linked bond is 
typically lower than that of the corresponding nominal bond, this may also lead to the presence of a 
liquidity premium, which in turn is likely to vary for the different maturities. A liquidity premium 
would therefore imply that the BEIR tends to be biased downwards. Thirdly, break-even inﬂ  ation 
rates may sometimes change due to technical factors in the markets, which may have little to do 
with changes in inﬂ  ation expectations. Furthermore, tax factors may also have an impact.
Survey-based measures
Survey measures of long-term expectations from private-sector professional forecasters are 
available from three sources: the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), Consensus 
Economics Forecast and the Euro Zone Barometer. The main advantage of survey measures 
is that they may be considered “pure” or direct measures of inflation expectations, in that 
they are not affected by various premia or by technical market factors. Among the survey 
measures, the SPF may be considered the most useful for the ECB in terms of considering 
monetary policy credibility, mainly because of the large panel of respondents and the 
opportunity to assess risks around the point forecast. However, Consensus Economics 
Forecast is equally useful given its longer time span (since 1989). However, one important 
limitation of survey measures is that they are only available on a quarterly basis at most. 
1  For more information on BEIR and inﬂ   ation-linked bonds in particular, see also “Inﬂ   ation-linked bonds from a central bank 
perspective” by Juan Angel Garcia and Adrian van Rixtel, ECB Occasional Paper Series, no 62, June 2007. 31
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5   CONCLUSIONS
5 CONCLUSIONS
Over the last few decades central banks 
have gradually placed more emphasis on the 
transparency and predictability of their actions. 
Such developments have been inextricably 
linked to the parallel trend towards central bank 
independence and the corresponding need for 
greater accountability. 
Against this background, in this paper we have 
reviewed the main conceptual issues relating to 
predictability and the role of transparency as 
one of its main determinants. Our intention has 
been to identify and assess how, and on which 
subjects, central banks should communicate so 
as to enhance the predictability of the monetary 
policy process. In this pursuit, we have made 
an important distinction between short (i.e. the 
ability of ﬁ   nancial markets to anticipate the 
next interest rate decision by the central bank) 
and longer-term predictability – encompassing 
the ability of the private sector to understand 
the monetary policy objective(s) and systematic 
behaviour in reacting to different circumstances 
and contingencies – and arguing that this broader 
concept is ultimately the more meaningful from 
an economic perspective. 
Predictability matters because central banks 
affect the economy as much through their 
inﬂ  uence on expectations as through any direct 
effect of monetary policy decisions on short-
term interest rates. Policy-makers can raise their 
level of predictability by being transparent about 
their monetary policy strategy and providing in 
an open, clear and timely manner all relevant 
information on their objective(s), economic 
assessment and the rationale underlying their 
policy decisions. In this respect, a high level of 
short-term predictability should be regarded as 
the natural outcome of a central bank’s consistent 
pursuit of its monetary policy strategy combined 
with credible communication that supports the 
understanding of market participants and the 
general public. 
Transparency by itself is insufﬁ  cient to ensure a 
lasting impact on the formation of expectations, 
and hence on predictability, by ﬁ  nancial market 
participants. Guiding interest rate expectations 
in fact requires not only forward-looking 
communication, but also consistency between 
words and deeds and a track record of monetary 
policy decisions that supports the central 
bank’s credibility. Moreover, transparency 
means more than simply releasing information, 
as this does not, on its own, translate into a 
better understanding of monetary policy. For 
transparency to have a positive impact on 
predictability, we have shown that it does not 
only matter what type of information central 
banks publish, but also how this information 
is communicated to the general public and 
ﬁ  nancial markets in particular. We have argued 
that those central banks which communicate in 
a collegial, timely and frequent manner, which 
adapt their communication to their audience 
and which manage to communicate clearly and 
unambiguously will be amongst those central 
banks whose monetary policy decisions are the 
most predictable. 
Finally, measuring predictability is clearly not an 
easy task. Whilst it is clear that more effort needs 
to be devoted towards the empirical assessment 
of central banks’ longer-term predictability, 
which is inherently more difﬁ  cult to measure, 
the literature clearly shows that ﬁ  nancial market 
participants have been increasingly able to 
correctly anticipate central banks’ monetary 
policy decisions. Transparent monetary policies 
and improved communication efforts are likely 
to have played a signiﬁ   cant role in bringing 
about this improvement. 32
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